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Abstract This paper is an exploratory attempt to under-
stand gender-related differences in the behavior of inves-
tors in firms seeking equity financing. Using data from the
Swedish equity crowdfunding platform FundedByMe, we
find that female investors are less likely to invest in the
equity of firms that are younger and high tech and have a
higher percentage of equity offerings. This pattern seems
consistent with a greater risk aversion in female versus
male investors. Furthermore, female investors are more
likely to invest in projects in which the proportion of male
investors is higher.
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1 Introduction
With accelerating growth in the popularity of equity
investments facilitated through equity crowdfunding
platforms, we ask whether there are gender differences
in the pattern of equity investments. Investment behavior
is likely to depend on investor gender (for recent
reviews, see Croson and Gneezy 2009 and Bertrand
2011) evidenced by experimental studies, pension
wealth asset allocation choices, or managerial firm-
level investment decisions (Jianakoplos and Bernasek
1998; Barber and Odean 2001). To further such evi-
dence, in an explorative study, we seek to shed light on
gender-related differences of investment decision-
making in the setting of equity crowdfunding.
First, we draw from an established body of literature
arguing that gender-related differences of investment be-
havior are due to risk preferences and investigate whether
female investors are more risk averse in equity
crowdfunding. This is of great importance as equity
crowdfunding features two distinct characteristics for in-
vestors. First, this setting characterizes decision-making
under extreme risk relative to prior research settings (e.g.,
experimental studies, stock market, or pension funds).
Second, the uncertainty associated with equity investing
is compounded by limited investor expertise (Ahlers et al.
2015) in evaluating the adverse selection risks and moral
hazard problems inherent in equity investments (Gompers
and Lerner 2004). Overall, our first research question
explores whether gender influences the extent to which
investors choose risky projects in equity crowdfunding.
Second, by drawing from herding logic, we study the
extent to which the gender of prior investors is salient
information for herding when differentiating between
male and female investors. Herding is cited to be a
prominent feature of crowdfunding markets (Colombo
et al. 2015; Vismara 2016a; Hornuf and Schwienbacher
2015b), yet no empirical study has thus far attempted to
investigate the possibility of gender differences in
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herding. Therefore, our second research question ex-
plores whether the pattern of herding behavior across
the gender of investors in equity crowdfunding is influ-
enced by the gender of prior investors.
The setting of equity crowdfunding can provide addi-
tional insight into the study of gender differences in
investment behavior. To the extent in which we expect
that risk is a prominent feature of gender differences in
investment behavior, our gender-based analysis is likely
to be relevant in the context of equity crowdfunding. To
invest in young firms, individuals face high risk and
uncertainty regarding the value of a firm. A significant
amount of information asymmetry exists between inves-
tors and firms. Young firms tend to have limited histories
and track records for informed assessments by prospec-
tive investors and partners (Stuart et al. 1999). Entrepre-
neurs tend to be too optimistic or have a natural incentive
to exaggerate their prospects and the potential value of
their firm (Cooper et al. 1988; Busenitz and Barney
1997), which often is tied to growth expectations rather
than tangible assets in place (Shane and Cable 2002). The
erroneous valuation of entrepreneurial opportunities is a
direct result of such information issues. Furthermore, all
of these issues are likely to be exacerbated for small
investors who represent the majority of investors in
equity-crowdfunding platforms (compared with profes-
sional investors such as venture capitalists and business
angels). These small investors have limited expertise,
incentives, or available resources to perform any substan-
tiated due diligence.
Additional interest on the issue of gender and equity
crowdfunding comes from the premise that equity
crowdfunding has the potential to democratize ac-
cess to investment opportunities for female inves-
tors who are under-represented among traditional
equity investors, e.g., business angels and venture
capitalists. Overall, given the increasing growth
and popularity of equity crowdfunding, it seems
timely to shed light on the behavior of equity
crowdfunding participants in general (e.g., Ahlers
et al. 2015; Vismara 2016a) and the gender-
induced component of this behavior in particular.
We present two sets of evidence regarding the
gender-related behavior of investors. First, in line with
prior studies claiming that female investors are more
risk averse than male investors, we find that female
investors are less likely to invest in high-technology
firms, young firms, and firms with a higher percentage
of equity offered in the platform.
Second, we are the first, to the best of our knowledge,
to propose evidence regarding gender-related herding
effects. One might assume that women are more likely
to follow other women in their decisions to invest be-
cause of the risk aversion of female investors and the
potential circulation of investment information in com-
mon social networks shared by other women. In con-
trast, we find that female investors are more likely to
invest in firms with a higher proportion of male inves-
tors. There are several plausible explanations related to
social psychology, including (a) the stereotypical view
of women as incompetent investors and (b) the gender-
induced bias of women in male-dominated fields to
favor the decisions of men as the dominant group. We
discuss these explanations in detail later. Moreover, we
explore whether favorable firm characteristics moderate
the observed patterns of herding so that we can infer
rationality of herding behaviors. Drawing on the logic
borrowed from Zhang and Liu (2012), we test whether
certificates of firm quality, such as the receipt of prior
seed investment, dampen the momentum of herding; if
so, we conclude that herding is rational because subse-
quent investors infer that favorable characteristics drive
momentum, as prior investors tend to incorporate this
favorable information into their decisions (we clarify the
details of our reasoning later). In our setting, women fail
to observe that momentum behind men’s decisions for
investment is related to favorable project characteristics
and, thus, seem to be passively duplicating men’s
decisions.
We use data obtained from FundedByMe, the prima-
ry crowdfunding platform in Sweden. FundedByMe is
an online crowdfunding platform that started in 2011.
One year later, they added equity crowdfunding to their
set of operations, and since then, it has launched 40
successful equity campaigns. Our sample consists of
2537 investments by 1979 unique investors between
2012 and March 2015.1
The paper is organized as follows. The next section
discusses the theoretical literature on gender-related dif-
ferences in risk aversion and the herding behavior of
investors. Thereafter, we present the research setting,
data, and analysis. Finally, we present the study’s con-
clusions and discuss our findings and the limitations of
this research.
1 In the Electronic Supplementary Appendix, we provide a detailed
description of the FundedByMe platform and compare it with other
current platforms that were the subject of several research papers.
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2 Literature review
In this section, we develop two set of literature reviews
regarding the underlying gender-related drivers of be-
haviors with a particular focus on investment decisions.
We first give a general outline of gender differences as
pertains to the overarching theme of behavioral attitudes
towards risk perception. This perspective is among the
widely popular streams of literature in economics and
psychology that explain the determinants of gender-
related investment outcomes. Thereafter, we discuss
risks involved in equity crowdfunding and risk-related
gender differences in equity crowdfunding. The second
set of our literature review address differences in
herding behavior based on gender. We not only high-
light why herding is an appropriate lens to study the
sequential investment decisions of crowdfunding partic-
ipants but also propose how gender serves as salient
information and helps unpack the decision-making pro-
cess of individual investors.
2.1 Gender differences in risk taking for investing
The literature in the psychology and behavioral eco-
nomics has widely investigated gender-based behavioral
differences (Eckel and Grossman 2002; Byrnes et al.
1999). In a recent review of this literature on gender
differences, Croson and Gneezy (2009) highlight that
gender attitudes towards risk are a defining feature of
investment decisions.2 The evidence has accumulated
from diverse contexts, as this stream views context to be
an important boundary condition, mirroring the idea that
risk might be conceptually defined and perceived dif-
ferently in each context. Below, we follow suit and
enumerate some of these contexts and definitions of
what constitutes risks in each context to further explain
why our exploration of the equity crowdfunding context
could provide complementary evidence.
The first group of studies investigates gender-based
risk preferences in experimental settings. The experi-
mental studies use probability lotteries and suggest that
women are more risk averse than men (Eckel and
Grossman 2008; Holt and Laury 2002; Byrnes et al.
1999). The second set of evidence comes from empirical
studies. These studies mostly focus on asset allocation
of personal wealth and report mostly similar results to
experimental findings (Sunden and Surette 1998). Allo-
cation between stocks and bonds is usually viewed to
reflect risk preferences in this context; thus, a larger
contribution of pension assets in stocks shows a greater
risk-taking attitude, while investment in bonds shows
risk aversion (Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998). A third
stream of literature studies the context of corporate
policies and how they are linked to the gender of the
firm’s decision maker(s) such as executives. Whereas
these studies tend to suggest mixed results regarding
female-led firms and association with risky financial
decisions, their departing hypotheses highlight the risk
aversion of females compared to male executives or
managers. For instance, Faccio et al. (2014), in a large
sample of European firms, find that the transition from
male to female CEOs is associated with significant
reduction in corporate risk taking. In this setting, corpo-
rate risk taking is measured by leverage and earnings
volatility.
2.2 Risk in equity crowdfunding
Entrepreneurial financing literature recognizes that erro-
neous valuation of investment opportunities is often tied
to issues caused by the information asymmetry (and
moral hazard) faced by prospective investors. These
issues stem from the limited track record of firms in
allowing investors to make informed judgments. Fur-
thermore, absent direct and observable information
(such as sales) during the early stages of firm develop-
ment, valuations tend to be based on growth expecta-
tions or entrepreneurial vision, which are in turn often
influenced by the natural incentives of entrepreneurs or
their optimism to exaggerate their prospects (Cooper
et al. 1988; Busenitz and Barney 1997). Overall, infor-
mation asymmetries prevalent in equity investments of
young firms exacerbate adverse selection risk for
investors.
Equity crowdfunding characterizes risk capital, es-
pecially that aforementioned information problems
are more severe for small investors representative of
equity crowdfunding investors (Ahlers et al. 2015).
Unlike professional investors, small investors are less
likely to possess financial expertise or adequate time
to perform due diligence (Schwienbacher and Larralde
2012). In addition to limited expertise, small investors
might have limited incentives owing to their lower
2 In this section, we do not explain the underlying explanatory mech-
anisms in attitude differences towards risk amongmen and women (for
a discussion of possible social and biological differences, see Croson
and Gneezy (2009) and Sapienza et al. (2009). Such mechanisms are
tangential to our core arguments, albeit interesting.
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financial stake in order to evaluate investment oppor-
tunities. These factors highlight the risks involved in
equity investing for small investors. Therefore, given
the role played by gender in risk-taking behavior, we
expect that female investors, compared to their male
counterparts, are less likely to invest in risky firms in
the equity crowdfunding.
2.3 Herding in crowdfunding
There is strong and growing support in favor of herding,
which claims that a higher number of early contributors
increase the likelihood of success for crowdfunding
campaigns, with evidence from different crowdfunding
types such as donation based (Burtch et al. 2013), re-
ward based (Colombo et al. 2015), lending-based
(Zhang and Liu 2012), and equity based (Vismara
2016b; Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2015b). The premise
behind herding logic is the following. It is unlikely that
investors or individuals arrive at their decisions inde-
pendently from others; rather, they update their expec-
tations in a social process by observing others (Bandura
1977). Herding behavior is said to be more frequently
observed when there is outcome uncertainty and
sequentiality in information production. Both of these
conditions appear to be strongly present in the equity
crowd-funding context (Vismara 2016b; Hornuf and
Schwienbacher 2015b).
We argued previously that there are often uncer-
tainties of valuation combined with lack of expertise in
the evaluation of new firms by small investors. Investors
are likely to take into account others’ decisions given
this level of uncertainty, which is compounded by a lack
of incentives to exert resources to perform due diligence.
This might lead small investors to perhaps discount
some of the tangible information about the firm that
could have been otherwise obtained by careful screen-
ing of the information about the firm (presented in the
campaign). To save cognitive effort and resources from
time-consuming or difficult-to-process information such
as future financial projections, equity investors might
rely on cues of herding by observing others’ decisions.
With regard to sequentiality, equity crowdfunding
websites currently show updated reports containing in-
formation such as the funded amount, number of prior
investors, and the public profile of prior investors. Ad-
ditionally, platforms (e.g., FundedByMe) sometimes
allow sorting of projects based on the funding amount
received, which might encourage herding through easier
discovery of well-funded campaigns.
Studies that have focused on herding dynamics of
crowdfunders provide more sophisticated insight by
inquiring about (a) the type of information obtained
from observational learning and (b) whether herding is
rational or irrational. Herders might not only take into
account the percent funded or the number of previous
contributors; they also might attend to important cues
such as who the backers/investors are. Vismara (2016b)
finds that the public profile of funders contains salient
information regarding the identity of investors and their
history of investment activity, all of which can help
generate early momentum that is correlated with equity
campaign success.
As regards rationality, irrational herding is said to
occur when individuals passively follow others’ choices
(Croson and Shang 2008; Simonsohn and Ariely 2008),
in which case observational learning does not occur
(Banerjee 1992; Bikhchandani et al. 1992). If backers
are simply replicating others’ backing decisions, they
will be irresponsive to how others have arrived at such
funding decisions and ignore the characteristics of the
project/firm/listing presented in campaign. For instance,
Simonsohn and Ariely (2008) find that inexperienced
eBay bidders herd into auctions with more bids yet
ignore the fact that the swarm of bids results from low
starting prices. If investors are observational learners,
their inferences from observing others’ funding deci-
sions should be moderated by publicly observed attri-
butes such as the quality certificates of the project. To
illustrate this point, Zhang and Liu (2012) find that
lenders engage in active observational learning (also
here referred to as rational herding) and infer the cred-
itworthiness of borrowers by observing other lenders’
decisions such that herding is amplified (dampened)
when borrowers have poor credit grades (favorable bor-
rower characteristics).
2.4 Gender differences of herding in crowdfunding
As two instances of the two dimensions discussed in the
previous section, we investigate whether (a) the propor-
tion of prior investors of a given gender is viewed as
information relevant to herding and (b) if this Bgender-
related^ herding is rational or not (in the sense of Zhang
and Liu (2012)). One might argue that women are more
likely to follow women in their decision making due to
the circulation of investment information in common
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social networks shared by other women. Traditional
investors of venture capital firms significantly
underrepresent women (Greene et al. 2001; Harrison
and Mason 2007; Coleman and Robb 2009), which
might lead to barriers in the exchange of information
regarding investment opportunities for women investors
not sharing the same social ties; in other words, male
investors are viewed as the gatekeepers of investment
opportunities, and this process is re-enforced by the
reliance of male investors on male networks for infor-
mation and due diligence regarding investments. There
are, however, two reasons to question this logic in our
particular setting.
First, there are a number of things that could work
against the possible tendency of women to follow other
women in equity crowdfunding. Equity crowdfunding,
at least to a certain extent, removes the aforementioned
social barriers by reducing search constraints previously
facing female professional investors because of the open
and Bdemocratic^ setup of equity crowdfunding. The
equity crowdfunding platform lists all the projects on the
Internet in an open call (Ahlers et al. 2015; Hornuf and
Schwienbacher 2015a), broadcasting a similar set of
information with the aim of attracting as broad audience
as possible. These features of equity crowdfunding
might downsize the importance of the network, which
is used to restrict the flow of information about invest-
ment opportunities to female investors.
Second, prior research indicates that individuals’ be-
havior might be influenced by implicit and unintended
biases, such as the portrayal of women as less competent
than men, stemming from long-term exposure to cultur-
al stereotypes (Devine 1989; Eagly and Mladinic 1994).
Women might feel there are implicit biases against their
levels of competence, especially in male-dominated
categories/industries (Ridgeway 2009). As such, if we
assume that women share the same stereotypical views,
it is unlikely that women follow other women in this
investment setting. Related evidence from audit and
experimental studies suggests that women in male-
dominated fields (and other minorities in similar posi-
tions) might behave with a gender-induced bias and
favor members of dominant groups at similar rates to
those of the dominant group (e.g., Moss-Racusin et al.
2012; Nosek et al. 2002; Milkman et al. 2015). Togeth-
er, all of these arguments support the idea that women
are likely to pay more attention to the overall proportion
of prior male investors, who are viewed stereotypically
as more competent in equity investments, an area which
is further male dominated. Therefore, we expect that
there is a negative relationship between the number of
female investors in a given day of a firm’s listing and the
overall proportion of prior female investors.
After highlighting the prominence of gender in the
previous paragraphs as information relevant to female
investors’ decision-making, we turn our attention to the
rationality of herding based on an analytical model
developed by Zhang and Liu (2012). As much as female
investors assign herding momentum to favorable project
characteristics such as certificates of quality, the effect of
herding should be dampened. This pattern is likely to
indicate that female investors are rationally observing
the underlying reason for herding momentum and that
their decisions are the result of observational learning
(Banerjee 1992; Bikhchandani et al. 1992). Conversely,
if the effect of herding is amplified (dampened) in the
presence (absence) of favorable project characteristics,
then female investors are simply duplicating men’s de-
cisions without rationally observing what drives their
decisions. In this case, female investors follow descrip-
tive social norms or simply well-funded and salient
firms listed on the platform (Simonsohn and Ariely
2008; Croson and Shang 2008).
To disentangle mere conformity from rational obser-
vational learning, we look at how female investors react
to information on external certificates (e.g., receipt of
seed investment). To illustrate, suppose two firms with
an equal proportion of male investors at a given time, t.
One firm has external certificates, and the other has no
external certificates. From the perspective of female
investors, male investors must have sufficiently positive
private information or the competence to evaluate better
an investment proposal willing to fund a firm that is not
certified. However, the decision to invest in a certified
firm is easy to justify and does not necessarily imply
favorable private information on the part of prior male
investors. Therefore, it should follow that incremen-
tal quality inference about the not-certified firm is
higher for the subsequent female investor given the
same proportion of male investors at a given time,
t. In this sense, rational observational learning im-
plies that male-based herding momentum will be
dampened by favorable firm characteristics. There-
fore, we empirically test whether the negative rela-
tionship between the number of female investors in a
given day of a firm’s listing and the overall proportion
of prior female investors strengthens (or weakens)
with external certificates.
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3 Methods
3.1 Sample
We collected data from FundedByMe, the largest
crowdfunding platform in Sweden (Ingram and
Teigland, 2013).3 Our sample includes all investors in
31 campaigns,4 which include successful equity crowd-
funding campaigns posted on FundedByMe from the
start of equity crowdfunding by FundedByMe in 2012
to the end ofMarch 2015.We collected firm information
about the campaign from the FundedByMe website. We
were able to extract the name of investors and the time
of investment from the activity log of campaigns. We
excluded investments made from team members who
enjoy private information (we know their names from
the campaign) to keep a consistent sample in line with
our focal investigation. The final sample includes 2537
investments by 1979 unique investors.
We took several steps to code genders based on first
names. We first algorithmically used the API of
genderize.io (a similar procedure used in Greenberg
and Mollick 2014) by providing several country and
language inputs such as Swedish, German, and Finnish.
The algorithm returns the gender and a probability that a
specific name-gender attribution (male or female) was
correct; in the case it cannot decide, the algorithm
returns none. In a second step, one of the authors speak-
ing the Swedish language double-checked the accuracy
of the codes and completed the missing variables, with
additional help from the profile picture of the users,
LinkedIn and Google Search (mostly in ambiguous
cases such as unisex names). Most of the investors used
their real name instead of pseudonyms as FundedByMe
encourages this practice (in our sample, only approxi-
mately 3% of investors used pseudonyms).
3.2 Analysis of gender-related risk taking
Dependent variables There are several observed char-
acteristics of firms that we hypothesize to show the risk
profile of future cash flows. First, younger firms are
riskier because nascent firms suffer from liabilities of
newness and smallness (Stinchcombe 1965). They have
short track records and have had less time to accumulate
tangible resources, which increases the risk of invest-
ment. Firm age is the numbers of years since the firm’s
establishment. On average, investors invest in firms that
are 2.6 years old.
Second, the technology category is another proxy for
risk. Technology firms are involved in developing and
commercializing innovative projects with a high uncer-
tainty in outcome (Hall and Lerner 2012). Technology
firm is a dummy variable denoting 1 for firms operating
in the technology category such as mobile apps. Tech-
nology firms comprise 60% of investments and 58% of
the total firms.
The third variable of risk is the Equity offering (%) of
the campaign. Leland and Pyle (1977) suggest how
firms opportunistically choose to raise equity when
managers know that their shares are overvalued, and
investors perceive equity offerings as a negative signal,
taking this former information into consideration. Like-
wise, an owner’s decision to offer a lower amount of
equity can indicate less adverse selection risk in that a
bad outcome is less likely to be perceived by owners
(Ahlers et al. 2015). Furthermore, greater equity offer-
ings can dilute entrepreneurs’ incentive to commit to
their firms. Altogether, more Equity offering suggests
that a firm is riskier. On average, investments are in
firms that offer 12.5% of their equity.
Independent variable Female is a dummy variable
equal to one for female investors and zero for male
investors. Female investors commit about 20% of
investments.
Control variables Several variables might influence the
investment decisions of investors. We control for the
number of prior investors (No. prior investors) and the
frequency of investments in prior days (Investment
rate). Number of prior investors is on average 85 (with
a maximum of 365 investors). Investment frequency is
calculated as the number of prior investors divided by
days that have passed since the start of the campaign.
These values show the traction of a campaign and how
successful it has been so far. The campaigns receive on
average 0.8 investments per day (with a maximum of
5.5). The percentage of days passed (Share of days
passed) presents the number of days passed since the
3 In the supplementary online appendix, we explain FundedByMe
features with detail. We also compare FundedByMe with other equity
crowdfunding platforms.
4 There are 40 successful equity crowd-funding campaigns posted on
FundedByMe; however, we were not able to access the activity log and
investor names for 9 of these campaigns. We communicated this issue
to the helpful team of FundedByMe, and they also pointed to a transfer
from a legacy database as a reason for not showing those investments.
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launch of the campaign over its planned duration. The
passage of time can provide more information, such as
the percentage of funding and a forward-looking esti-
mation on whether the campaign will reach its funding
goal. The investment takes place on average after 37.5%
of the campaign duration has passed. There are also
time-invariant control variables. We group a number of
variables that (a) are correlated positively with the un-
observable direct quality of the firm and (b) are difficult
and costlier for a low-quality type of firm to imitate
compared to a high-quality firm. External certificate is
a dummy variable and takes value one if a firm has filed
for patent, received governmental seed investment, or
introduced a lead investor (VC or angel); otherwise, it is
zero. Patent shows the capability of R&D staff and
technical capabilities of the firm and is viewed as a
valuable positive signal decreasing information asym-
metry for investors (Hsu and Ziedonis 2013). Affiliation
with prestigious external stakeholders (e.g., (reputable)
VCs) increases the legitimacy of the new firm, as new
firms can borrow the reputation and legitimacy of those
firms (Stuart et al. 1999). On average, 52.7% of invest-
ments are in firms with external certificates. Further-
more, we include the natural logarithm of valuation in
Swedish Krona (SEK). The valuation of firms varies
between 2.1 and 69.9million SEK, with a mean value of
26.9 million SEK.5 Given that entrepreneurs have a
richer endowment of social capital from their home
country (Dahl and Sorenson 2012), we control for loca-
tion, which is set to one if the firm is located in Sweden
and otherwise is set to zero. As female investors might
bemore likely to invest in projects with a higher share of
female team members, we insert a dummy Woman on
Team that is set to one if there is at least one female
member on the project team and otherwise is set to zero.
Finally, first-time investors on the platform might be
systematically different from investors with a prior his-
tory of investment using this platform in that these
investors might include friends and family. Therefore,
Investment experience takes a value of one for investors
with a prior history of funding a firm on the platform and
otherwise is zero for first-time investors. Investments
made by repeated investors comprise 13% of invest-
ments. To capture possible temporal trends, we insert
week-day (6 dummies) and year fixed-effect (2
dummies) in all models.
Model specification We use ordinary least square (OLS)
regression when dependent variable is Firm age and
Equity offering and we employ logit regression when
dependent variable is Technology firm. Specifically, we
use the following specification:
Y ¼ β0 þ β1:Femaleþ α Controlsþ ε ð1Þ
Y defines separately the following risk proxies: Firm
age, Technology firm, and Equity offering. The standard
errors are robust and clustered around investors to con-
trol for non-independence of observations for investors
across firms.
Analysis Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of
variables in addition to correlation matrix, and Table 2
presents the results of regressions models.
We perform formal tests of variance inflated factor
(VIF) and conditional index (Belsley et al. 1980), and
these tests do not suggest severe issues of multi-
collinearity.
Model I presents the estimates of OLS model
predicting Firm age. The coefficient of Female is pos-
itive and statistically significant (p < 0.01), suggesting
that female investors are more likely to invest in older
firms. In terms of magnitude, female investors, com-
pared with male investors, are associated with firms that
are on average less than one year older (0.76). Model II
presents the coefficients of logit regression predicting
Technology firm. Female investors are 35.7% less likely
to invest in firms categorized as technology intensive
(p < 0.01). Finally, model III shows estimates of the
OLSmodel predicting Equity offering. Female investors
are less likely to invest in firms with higher equity
offering (p < 0.05). The coefficient implies that female
investors, compared with male investors, are associated
with firms that on average offer −0.48% less equity.
Altogether, these results provide supporting evidence
in favor of H1.
We also employ Tobit specification on model I and
model III because the dependent variables are non-neg-
ative. The results remain unchanged.
3.3 Herding and gender in equity crowdfunding
Dependent variable Number of female (male) investors
in each day is the count of the current incremental
number of female (male) investors. These variables are
logged.
5 From 2013 to 2015, the average of the exchange rate was equal to 7.1
USD/SEK.
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Independent variable Female share of prior investors is
the proportion of investors who are female to the total
count of all investors until the previous day of the
campaign.
Control variables We include time-varying control var-
iables such as No. of prior investors and Frequency of
prior investors. The number of prior investors is the
total count of prior investors until the previous day,
and the Frequency of prior investors represents the total
number of prior investors divided by the number of days
that have passed until the previous day. We also includ-
ed week-day fixed effects. Table 3 reports descriptive
statistics, including the mean and standard deviation in
addition to the correlation of variables.
Model specification We identify herding using the fol-
lowing specification. yjt represents the incremental num-
ber of female investors at each day t investing in firm j
(for brevity of argument, we focus only on female inves-
tors as a dependent variable in the following description).
Let Yj, t − 1 be the lagged total proportion of female
investors and Xjt be other observable time-varying attri-
butes related to the funding progress of firm j.
yjt ¼ αY j;t−1 þ β1X jt þ β2Z j þ uj þ vjt ð2Þ
It is unlikely that we will capture every source of
heterogeneity across firms given our available data. For
instance, firms could have products that appeal to
female investors, such as fashionable women’s clothes,
which might attract female investors, yet our data does
not include a variable denoting the product-category
variable. Therefore, the unobserved firm attributes rep-
resented as uj could consist of, for instance, fashionable
clothes for women. As a result, uj might be correlated
with both the proportion of female investors (i.e., Yj,t − 1)
and the current incremental female investors attracted
(i.e., yjt). This would cause endogeneity problems in
estimating the effect of Yj,t − 1 on yjt (i.e., coefficient of
α in the Eq. 2). Therefore, we need to control for
unobserved firm heterogeneity with firm-fixed effects
to capture the unobserved correlation of preferences
among female investors facing the same firm. We as-
sume that uj is time invariant because firm attributes are
unlikely to radically vary from the launch of the cam-
paign to the end of the campaign. Given the strict
multicollinearity between observable time-invariant
firm attributes Zj with unobserved firm-fixed effect uj,
the effect of Zj cannot be separately estimated. We
argued that given website design features of
FundedByMe, such as featuring the well-funded firms
and the inclusion of these firms in the newsletter emails
subscribed by investors, it is likely that well-funded
firms become salient to subsequent investors and give
rise to irrational herding. By drawing on cross-sectional
variation in the publicly observable firm attributes, we
can distinguish whether investors are replicating others’
decisions and ignore how others have arrived at such
decisions. Consistent with Zhang and Liu’s (2012)
Table 1 Summary statistics and pairwise correlation (N = 2537)
Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1. Firm age 2.64 2.64 –
2. Technology firm 0.61 0.49 −0.53 –
3. Equity offering (%) 12.56 7.35 0.38 −0.10 –
4. Female 0.20 0.40 0.14 −0.13 0.01 –
5. No. prior investors 3.91 1.22 0.27 −0.08 0.21 0.02 –
6. Investment rate 0.79 1.22 0.19 −0.07 0.15 −0.03 0.24 –
7. Share of days passed 0.37 0.35 −0.19 −0.05 −0.10 0.03 0.21 −0.42 –
8. External certificate 0.53 0.50 0.30 0.24 0.06 0.00 0.17 0.14 −0.29 –
9. Woman on team 0.58 0.49 0.37 −0.03 0.50 0.05 0.10 0.14 −0.19 0.32 –
10. Valuationa 16.73 0.94 0.20 −0.23 −0.31 −0.03 0.38 0.36 −0.31 0.24 −0.21 –
11. Sweden 0.64 0.48 0.44 −0.45 0.46 0.02 0.32 0.31 −0.20 −0.05 0.43 0.30 –
12. Investment experience 0.13 0.34 −0.06 −0.03 0.04 −0.18 −0.17 −0.02 −0.05 −0.06 0.00 −0.07 0.00
a This variable is logged
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operationalization of this idea, we include the interac-
tion term between lagged proportion of female investors
and publicly observable firm attributes (Zj) such as
External certificate.
yjt ¼ αY j;t−1 þ β1X jt þ β2Z j þ β3Y j;t−1Z j þ uj
þ vjt ð3Þ
As a result of rational observational learning, a sub-
sequent female investor would make more positive in-
cremental quality inference after observing the momen-
tum associated with higher-proportion of male investors
(i.e., male-based herding momentum) about a firm with-
out external certificate. We expect the male-based
herding momentum will be accentuated by unfavorable
firm characteristics and dampened by favorable firm
characteristics in case of rational herding. Thus, the
moderating effect of male-based herding on External
certificate is relevant in determining whether female
investors are rational observational learners or not. As
such, in Eq. 3, if β3 has the same (opposite) sign as
external certificate effect (i.e., positive) for subsequent
female investors, subsequent female investors are irra-
tional observational learners of proportion of male
(female) investors.
Analysis We present descriptive statistics in Table 3 and
the results from fixed-effect regression analysis in Ta-
ble 4. Models I and II are models with the dependent
variable set to the number of female investors, and
models III and IV are related to the number of male
investors as dependent variables.
There are two noteworthy results in models I and II,
which predict the number of female investors in a given
day. First, the coefficient of Female share of prior
investors is negative (p < 0.1) in model I. Second, the
Table 2 Regression analysis





















Woman on team 0.527*** −0.173 −0.756**
(0.071) (0.150) (0.332)
Valuationa −0.002 −1.013*** −5.440***
(0.056) (0.071) (0.177)






Constant −1.535* 17.891*** 82.749***
(0.809) (1.179) (2.606)




N 2537 2537 2537
Specification OLS Logit OLS
R-squared 0.343 – 0.640
Pseudo-R-squared – 0.314 –
In all models, robust standard errors are reported in parentheses
* , ** , and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level, respectively
a This variable is logged
Table 3 Summary statistics and pairwise correlation (N = 1639)
Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1. No. female investorsa 0.165 0.429 –
2. No. male investorsa 0.477 0.695 0.54 –
3. No. prior investorsa 3.628 1.311 0.05 −0.01 –
4. Frequency of prior investors 2.861 5.705 0.28 0.34 0.44 –
5. Share of female prior investors 0.162 0.155 0.26 0.03 0.25 0.07 –
6. External certificate 0.485 0.500 –0.01 –0.03 0.23 0.18 –0.02
a This variable is logged
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interaction term between share of Female share of prior
investors and External certificate is negative (p < 0.01)
in model II (in this model, External certificate is
dropped due to the strict collinearity with project fixed
effects). Combined, these results suggest that women
are less (more) likely to follow women (men) and that
this effect is stronger when there is an external certificate
of the project. The amplified effect of gender-related
herding in the presence of favorable characteristics in-
dicate the women are not assigning gender-related
herding momentum to the quality of the project and
are thus ignoring the reasons behind male investors’
decisions.
We perform the same set of analyses in models III
and IV, which predict the number of male investors in a
given day. The coefficient of Share of prior female
investors is positive but not significant at conventional
significance levels. In model IV, we also do not find a
moderating effect of External certificate for Share of
female prior investors. Overall, these results suggest
differing patterns of gender-related herding for male
investors compared with female investors.
4 Discussion and conclusions
By observing gender-induced patterns of investments
from one equity crowd-funding platform located in
Sweden, we present evidence regarding risk-averse
attitudes in female investors. Furthermore, the results
regarding gender-related herding are novel in that we
shed light on the various processes of decision-
making for female investors compared with male in-
vestors. Our results suggest that women are perhaps
biased in their view of the competence of other women
in equity investing, interestingly resulting in duplicat-
ing men’s decisions.
Our paper has several contributions and limitations.
First, this study contributes to the literature explicating
the role of gender in investment behavior and, more
specifically, explores gender differences in herding.
Although Sweden ranks persistently high in the list of
gender equalitarian countries in the world,6 cultural
stereotypes might still persist. We believe there is
room to educate investors, who happen to suffer from
under-representation in managerial positions in firms
and in male-dominated fields/industries such as angel
investing or venture capitalists, against competence-
bias. Furthermore, we complement studies that offer
insight into the role of risk aversion based on gender
and link these perceptions to investment outcomes.
Particularly, this is the first time that the setting of
equity investments is used to showhowseveral hypoth-
esized parameters of risk combine to inform the deci-
sions of female investors in the equity-crowdfunding
platform.Finally,wecontribute to thenascent literature
on crowdfunding (Belleflamme et al. 2014; Mollick
2014; Colombo et al. 2015; Agrawal et al. 2015;
Ahlers et al. 2015; Hornuf and Schwienbacher
2015a). By investigating the gender-related patterns
of investment behaviors, we suggest how gender-
based risk-preferences play a role.
Our study has several limitations that open up
avenues for future research. First, our study is limited
in that the observed variables chosen might possibly
capture other dimensions relevant to female decision
making unrelated to risk (e.g., disposable income), or
even unobservable preferences, such as the desire to
support socially beneficial products or services by
women investors (Harrison and Mason 2007). We
agree with this shortcoming, which is one of the
problems of research designs that look at aggregated
real-life investment decisions commonly present in
prior research. It is therefore helpful to complement
our study with field experiments mimicking
crowdfunding settings that allow for better identifica-
tion strategies. Despite this methodological issue, we
contend in support of our risk-aversion conviction
that (a) equity investment inherently characterizes a
decision with a high component of risk and that (b) the
role of risk perception is obviously stronger and sa-
lient for equity crowdfunding participants with poten-
tially limited expertise and resources to evaluate the
quality of firms, at least compared to prior empirical
settings in asset allocation in bonds and stocks or
lotteries with low-sized stakes. We used several prox-
ies of risk in this context, and the results are all
statistically significant; thus, we cannot argue that
our proxies combined are on average always unrelated
to risk preferences, and we are only observing spuri-
ous correlations.
Second, the limitations of our study are related to the
generalization of results based on a single platform
located in one country. First, future replication studies
across countries and platforms are encouraged to under-
stand whether certain institutional contexts of the6 http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2014/
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platform or the country of investors present in our study
influence the findings of the study. For instance, cur-
rently, FundedByMe allows all individuals to invest as
opposed to certain accredited and wealthy individuals.
Furthermore, Sweden is a country in which the political
and legal systems encourage gender equality (World
Economic Forum, 2014); further research in other coun-
tries should yield interesting insights and highlight
which institutional factors combine to inform the invest-
ment decisions of female investors. Given the nascent
state of equity crowdfunding, there seems to be a large
heterogeneity among the functioning of the platforms
(i.e., business models) influenced by the legal protection
of investor rights in each country. Therefore, caution
should be taken about the generalizability of our results
across location and time.
Our research also has managerial implications. For
platform creators, we suggest that platforms facilitate
the presentation and digestion of information to inves-
tors; for instance, platforms could hire independent
third-party professional investors such as angel inves-
tors to declare their opinion about valuation of the
company, risk factors, and so on. This information
might reduce decision bias and attract more female
investors.
Future research can benefit from applying other
theories of judgment and decision making to offer
insights to the domain of equity-based crowdfunding.
Acknowledging that decision makers are bounded by
rationality (i.e., plagued by various decision-making
biases) and that decisions are typically made based on
limited and incomplete information that is further
compounded by uncertainty (Dunham 2010; Simon
1979), individuals might use heuristics for judgment.
Though heuristics are shortcuts that expedite decision-
making and save cognitive resources, they are often
inaccurate (Tversky and Kahneman 1973). We know
little about what cognitive shortcuts or rules equity
crowdfunding investors will employ in their search
of investment opportunities in addition to herding
(Wood and Williams 2014). Along with our under-
standing of decision making from the study of venture
capitalists’ decision-making (Zacharakis and Meyer
2000), it is interesting to explore questions such as
whether participants of crowdfunding show overcon-
fidence and, if so, how this is linked to gender.
Table 4 Firm fixed-effect panel data regression
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
No. female investorsa No. male investorsa
No. prior investorsa −0.084*** −0.082*** −0.256*** −0.255***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.022) (0.022)
Frequency of prior investors 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.045*** 0.045***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Share of prior female investors −0.279* 0.002 0.405 0.467
(0.161) (0.188) (0.256) (0.300)




Constant 0.433*** 0.447*** 1.107*** 1.110***
(0.052) (0.052) (0.082) (0.082)
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-day fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1639 1639 1639 1639
P value of joint F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
In all models, robust standard errors are reported in parentheses
* , ** , and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively
a This variable is logged
bGiven the strict multicollinearity between external certificate with firm-fixed effects, the effect of external certificate cannot be separately
estimated
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